Risk aversion, heterogeneity and contests

Public Choice

Volumn 117, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 1-25

  Cornes, Richard ^a   Hartley, Roger ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b KEELE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642539086     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026136008608     Document Type: Review

References (23)

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