Delegated portfolio management: A survey of the theoretical literature

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 20, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 823-848

  Stracca, Livio ^a  

^a EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK   (Germany)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Agency; Delegated portfolio management; Moral hazard; Principal agent models

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 33751034199     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: 14676419     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2006.00271.x     Document Type: Review

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