Why constrain your mutual fund manager?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 73, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 289-321

  Almazan, Andres ^a   Brown, Keith C ^a   Carlson, Murray ^b   Chapman, David A ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^c BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Investment restrictions; Mutual funds

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242752696     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.05.007     Document Type: Article

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