Relative performance evaluation contracts and asset market equilibrium

Economic Journal

Volumn 115, Issue 506, 2005, Pages 1077-1102

  Kapur, Sandeep ^a   Timmermann, Allan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MARKET CONDITIONS; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT;

EID: 28244472068     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01033.x     Document Type: Review

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