Reputation and performance fee effects on portfolio choice by investment advisers

Journal of Financial Markets

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 227-271

  Huddart, Steven ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation; Fee; Investment adviser; Open end

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033176854     PISSN: 13864181     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1386-4181(98)00013-5     Document Type: Article

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