Risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 113-137

  Palomino, Frédéric ^a   Prat, Andrea ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037362229     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3087446     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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