Interim information in long-term contracts

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 1041-1067

  Strausz, Roland ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750470822     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00127.x     Document Type: Review

References (25)

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