Economic organization: The case for candor

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 48-57

  Williamson, Oliver E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030527494     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMR.1996.9602161564     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Arrow, K. J. 1987. Reflections on the essays. In G. Feiwel (Ed.), Arrow and the foundations of the theory of economic policy: 727-734. New York: New York University Press.
2. Arthur, B. 1989. Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events. Economic Journal, 99: 116-131.
3. Barnard, C. 1962. The functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1938)
4. Coase, R. H. 1988. The nature of the firm: Influence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4: 33-47.
5. Commons, J. R. 1932. The problem of correlating law, economics and ethics. Wisconsin Law Review, 8: 3-26.
6. Crozier, M. 1964. The bureaucratic phenomenon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
7. Goffman, I. 1969. Strategic interaction. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
8. Hayek, F. 1945. The use of knowledge in society, American Economic Review, 35: 519-530.
9. Joskow, P. L. 1991. The role of transaction cost economics in antitrust and public utility regulatory policies [Special issue]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7: 53-83.
10. Lange, O. 1938. On the theory of economic socialism. In B. Lippincott (Ed.), On the economic theory of socialism: 55-143. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
11. Liebowitz, S. J., & Margolis, S. E. 1995. Path dependence, lock-in, and history. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11.
12. Matthews, R. C. O. 1986. The economics of institutions and the sources of economic growth. Economic Journal, 96: 903-918.
13. Michels, R. 1966. Political parties. New York: Free Press.
14. Simon, H. 1957. Administrative behavior (2nd ed.). New York: Macmillan.
15. Simon, H. 1985. Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with political science. American Political Science Review, 79: 293-304.
16. Simon, H. 1991. Organizations and markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5: 25-44.
17. Williamson, O. E. 1975. Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: Free Press.
18. Williamson, O. E. 1979. Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22: 233-261.
19. Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
20. Williamson, O. E. 1991. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 269-296.
21. Williamson, O. E. 1993. Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. Journal of Law and Economics, 36: 453-486.
22. Williamson, O. E. 1996. The mechanisms of governance. New York: Oxford University Press.