Social welfare, corruption and credibility: Public management's role in economic development

Public Management Review

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 227-252

  Knott, Jack H ^a   Miller, Gary J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Autonomy; Bureaucracy; Corruption; Credible commitment; Political economy; Professionalism; Reform; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749862179     PISSN: 14719037     EISSN: 14719045     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14719030600587455     Document Type: Article

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