Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm

Economic Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 565-589

  Kelsey, David ^a   Milne, Frank ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

^b QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Externality; General equilibrium; Objective function of the firm; Two part tariff

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749416969     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0036-8     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Allen, F., Gale, D.: Corporate governance and competition. In: Vives, X. (ed.) Corporate governance, pp. 23-76. Cambridge: CUP 2000
2. Böhm, V.: The foundations of the theory of monopolistic competition revisited. J Econ Theory 63, 1-24 (1994)
3. Bolton, P., Xu, C.: Ownership and managerial competition: employee, customer or outside ownership. Working paper, Princeton University (1999)
4. Conley, J., Wooders, M.: Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics. J Econ Theory 98, 261-294 (2001)
5. Cornes, R., Sandler, T.: The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996
6. Cornwall, R.: The concept of general equilibrium in a market economy with imperfectly competitive producers. Metroeconomica 29, 55-72 (1977)
7. Dixit, A., Norman, V.: Theory of international trade. Cambridge: CUP 1980
8. Edlin, A., Epelbaum, M., Heller, W.: Is perfect price discrimination really efficient? Welfare and existence in general equilibrium. Econometrica 66, 897-922 (1998)
9. Ellickson, B.: Competitive equilibrium: theory and applications. New York: CUP 1993
10. Ellickson, B., Grodal, B., Scotchmer, S., Zame, W.: Clubs and the market. Econometrica 67, 1185-1218 (1999)
11. Farrell, J.: Owner-consumers and efficiency. Econ Lett 19, 303-306 (1985)
12. Hansmann, H.: The ownership of enterprise. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1996
13. Hart, O.D.: On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete. J Econ Theory 11, 418-443 (1975)
14. Hart, O., Moore, J.: Property rights and the nature of the firm. J Polit Econ 98, 1119-1158 (1990)
15. Hart, O., Moore, J.: The governance of exchanges: members' cooperatives versus outside ownership. Oxford Rev Econ Policy 12, 53-69 (1996)
16. Holmstrom, B.: The firm as a subeconomy. J Law Econ Organ 15, 74-102 (1999)
17. Jensen, M., Meckling, W.: Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. J Financ Econ 3, 305-360 (1976)
18. Kelsey, D., Milne, F.: The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm. J Math Econ 25, 229-245 (1996)
19. Kelsey, D., Milne, F.: Imperfect competition and corporate governance. University of Birmingham Discussion paper 03-01 (2003)
20. Laffont, J.J.: Fundamentals of public economics. Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1988
21. Milgrom, P., Roberts, J.: Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities. Econometrica 58, 1255-1277 (1990)
22. Milgrom, P., Shannon, C.: Monotone comparative statics. Econometrica 62, 157-180 (1994)
23. Milne, F.: Corporate investment and finance theory in general equilibrium. Econ Rec 511-533 (1974)
24. Milne, F.: The firm's objective function as a collective choice problem. Public Choice 37, 473-486 (1981)
25. Milne, F., Shefrin, H.: Information and securities: a note on Pareto dominance and the second best. J Econ Theory 43, 314-328 (1987)
26. Prescott, E., Townsend, R.: Firms as clubs in Walrasian markets with private information. Working paper (2000)
27. Renstrom, T., Yalcin, E.: Endogenous firm objectives. J Publ Econ Theory 5, 67-94 (2003)
28. Roberts, J., Steen, E.V.: Shareholder interests, human capital investment and corporate governance. Working paper Stanford Business School (2000)
29. Roemer, J.E.: Would economic democracy decrease the amount of public bads? Scand J Econ 95, 227-238 (1993)
30. Sen, A.K.: Collective choice and social welfare. Amsterdam: North Holland 1970
31. Sen, A.K.: The concept of efficiency. In: Parkin M., Nobay R. (eds.) Contemporary issues in economics, pp. 196-210. Manchester: Manchester University Press 1973
32. Sen, A.K.: Social choice theory: a re-examination. Econometrica 45, 217-245 (1977)
33. Shafer, W., Sonnenschein, H.: Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences. J Math Econ 2, 345-348 (1975)
34. Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.: A survey of corporate governance. J Finance 52, 33-56 (1997)
35. Tirole, J.: Corporate governance. Econometrica 69,1-35 (2001)