Endogenous firm objectives

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 67-94

  Yalçin, Erkan ^a   Renström, Thomas I ^b,c  

^a YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^c CEPR ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249811148     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00122     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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