Do pills poison operating performance?

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 536-559

  Danielson, Morris G ^a   Karpoff, Jonathan M ^b  

^a SAINT JOSEPH S UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Operating performance; Poison pill; Takeover defense

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645847156     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.10.001     Document Type: Article

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