Collaborating to compete

Marketing Science

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 105-126

  Amaldoss, Wilfred ^a   Meyer, Robert J ^b   Raju, Jagmohan S ^b   Rapoport, Amnon ^c  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Competitive strategy; Experimental economics; Game theory; New product development; Strategic alliances

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034146292     PISSN: 07322399     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.19.2.105.11804     Document Type: Article

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