How learning affects the evolution of strong reciprocity

Adaptive Behavior

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 211-221

  Calderón, Juan Pablo ^a,b   Zarama, Roberto ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

^b Ingeniería Industrial ^*  (Colombia)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Evolution of strong reciprocity; Learning; Ontogenic adaptations; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747326870     PISSN: 10597123     EISSN: 17412633     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/105971230601400306     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Baldwin, J. (1896). A new factor in evolution. American Naturalist, 30, 441-451.
2. Bethwaite, J., & Tompkinson, P. (1996). The ultimatum game and non-selfish utility functions. Journal of Economic Psychology, 17, 259-271.
3. Bolton, G. E., & Zwick, R. (1995). Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 95-121.
4. Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Econometrics, 114, 817-868.
5. Gintis, H. (2000). Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 206, 169-179.
6. Güth, W., & Tietz, R. (1990). Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results. Journal of Economic Psychology, 11(3), 417-449.
7. Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimate bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367-388.
8. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & McElreath, R. (2001). In search of homo economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. American Economic Review, 91, 73-78.
9. Johnston, T. (1982). Selective costs and benefits in the evolution of learning. In J. Rossenblatt, R. Hinde, C. Beer, & M. Busnel (Eds.), Advances in the study of behavior, Volume 12. New York: Academic Press.
10. Mayley, G. (1996). The evolutionary cost of learning. In P. Maes, M. Mataric, J. Meyer, J. Pollack, & S. Wilson (Eds.), From Animals to Animals 4: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
11. Maynard Smith, J. (1993). The theory of evolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
12. Nowak, M. A., Page, K. M., & Sigmund, K. (2000). Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game. Science, 289, 1773-1775.
13. Page, K. M., & Nowak, M. A. (2000). A generalized adaptive dynamics framework can describe the ultimatum game. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 209, 173-179.
14. Page, K. M., & Nowak, M. A. (2002). Empathy leads to fairness. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 64, 1101-1116.
15. Roth, A. E. (1995). Bargaining experiments. In J. H. Kagel & A. E. Roth (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics (pp. 253-348). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
16. Roth, A. E., Prasknikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., & Zamir, S. (1991). Bargaining and market power in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 81, 1068-1095.
17. Sánchez, A., & Cuesta, J. (2005). Altruism may arise from individual selection. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 235, 233-240.
18. Sigmund, K., Fehr, E., & Nowak, M. (2002). The economics of fair play. Scientific American, 286(1), 82-87.
19. Thaler, R. H. (1988). The ultimatum game. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(4), 195-206.
20. Turney, P. (1996). Myths and legends of the Baldwin effect. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Evolutionary Computation and Machine Learning at the 13th Conference on Machine Learning (ICLM-96) (pp. 135-142). Italy.
21. Waddington, C. (1942). Canalization of development and inheritance of acquired characters. Nature, 150, 563-565.