Inflation of conditional predictions

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Volumn 135, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 429-447

  Koriat, Asher ^a   Fiedler, Klaus ^b   Bjork, Robert A ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Conditional prediction; Confirmation bias; Metacognition; Overprediction; Probability judgment

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; ARTICLE; EPIDEMIOLOGY; FEMALE; HUMAN; LEARNING; MALE; PERSONALITY TEST; PSYCHOMETRY; STATISTICAL MODEL; STATISTICS;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; ASSOCIATION LEARNING; BIAS (EPIDEMIOLOGY); FEMALE; HUMANS; LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONS; MALE; PROBABILITY LEARNING; PSYCHOMETRICS; WORD ASSOCIATION TESTS;

EID: 33746632662     PISSN: 00963445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0096-3445.135.3.429     Document Type: Article

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