Congressional opposition, the economy, and U.S. dispute initiation, 1946-2000

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 463-483

  Brulé, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

Author keywords

Diversionary use of force; Divided government; Institutional constraints; Policy availability; Presidents

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745786802     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002706289180     Document Type: Article

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