Political Business Cycles in EU Accession Countries

European Union Politics

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 231-250

  Hallerberg, Mark ^a   de Souza, Lúcio Vinhas ^b   Clark, William Roberts ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

^c NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

central bank independence; EU enlargement; European Union; political business cycles

Indexed keywords

EID: 84996182902     PISSN: 14651165     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1465116502003002005     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Äimä, Kuusta (1998) ‘Central Bank Independence in the Baltic Countries’, Review of Economies in Transition, No. 3, Suomen Pankki (Bank of Finland).
2. Clark, William Roberts and Mark Hallerberg (2000) ‘Strategic Interaction between Monetary and Fiscal Actors under Full Capital Mobility’, American Political Science Review 94: 323-346.
3. Clark, William Roberts and Usha Nair Reichert (1998) ‘International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycle Behavior’, International Organization 52: 87-120.
4. De Grauwe, Paul (1997) ‘Paradigms of Macroeconomics Policy for the Open Economy’, in Michele Fratianni, Dominick Salvatore, and Jürgen von Hagen (eds) Macroeconomic Policy in Open Economies, Handbook of Comparative Economic Policies, Volume 5, pp. 15-54. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
5. De Grauwe, Paul and Yunus Aksoy (1999) ‘Are Central European Countries Part of the European Optimum Currency Areas?’, in Paul De Grauwe and Vladimir Lavrac (eds) Inclusion of Central European Countries in the European Monetary Union, pp. 13-36. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
6. Franzese, Robert (1996) ‘The Political Economy of Public Debt: An Empirical Examination of the OECD Post-war Experience’. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
7. Greene, William (2000) Econometric Analysis, 4th edn. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
8. Hallerberg, Mark and Jürgen von Hagen (1998) ‘Electoral Institutions and the Budget Process’, in Kiichiro Fukasaku and Ricardo Hausmann (eds) Democracy, Decentralisation and Deficits in Latin America, pp. 65-94. Paris: OECD.
9. Hallerberg, Mark and Jürgen von Hagen (1999) ‘Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union’, in James Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen (eds) Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pp. 209-232. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
10. Hallerberg, Mark, Lúcio Vinhas de Souza, and William Roberts Clark (2002) ‘Monetary Institutions and the Politics of the Macro-economy in EU Accession Countries’, in Ron Linden (ed.) Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
11. Hibbs, Douglas (1977) ‘Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy’, American Political Science Review 71: 1467-1487.
12. Keech, William (1995) Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
13. Lucas, Robert (1976) ‘Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique’, in Karl Brunner and Alan Meltzer (eds) The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series Public Policy, pp. 19-46. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
14. MacRae, Duncan (1977) ‘A Political Model of the Business Cycle’, Journal of Political Economy 85: 239-263.
15. Mundell, Robert (1961) ‘A Theory of an Optimum Currency Area’, American Economic Review 51: 657-665.
16. Mundell, Robert (1997) ‘Updating the Agenda for Monetary Union’, in Mario Bleijer, Jacob Frenkel, Leonardo Leiderman, and Assaf Razin (eds) Optimum Currency Area. New Analytical and Policy Developments, pp. 29-48. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
17. Nordhaus, William (1975) ‘The Political Business Cycle’, Review of Economic Studies 42: 169-190.
18. Oatley, Thomas (1999) ‘How Constraining Is Mobile Capital? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy’, American Journal of Political Science 43: 1003-1027.
19. Roubini, Nouriel and Jeffry Sachs (1989) ‘Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies’, European Economic Review 33: 903-933.
20. Shvetsova, Olga (1999) ‘A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions: 1990-98’, Electoral Studies 18: 397-409.
21. Tufte, Edward (1978) The Political Control of the Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
22. Vinhas de Souza, Lúcio (2001) ‘Integrated Monetary and Exchange Rate Frameworks: Are There Empirical Differences?’, Working Papers Series, Bank of Estonia, Estonia.
23. Vinhas de Souza, Lúcio and Jens Hölscher (2001) ‘Exchange Rates Links and Strategies of New EU Entrants’, Journal of European Integration 23: 1-28.
24. Vinhas de Souza, Lúcio and Jens Húlscher (2002) ‘Exchange Rate Strategies of New EU Entrants’, in Eric Pentecost (ed.) European Monetary Integration. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
25. Vinhas de Souza, Lúcio, Holger van Eden, Elisabeth Ledrut, Albert de Groot, and Gerbert Romijn (1999) ‘EMU and Enlargement: A Review of Policy Issues’, Economic Affairs Series, Working Paper ECON 117 EN, Directorate General for Research, European Parliament, Luxembourg.
26. von Hagen, Jürgen and Ian Harden (1994) ‘Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline’, European Economic Review 39: 771-779.