Deterrence is dead. Long live deterrence

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 115-120

  Zagare, Frank C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744985554     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: 15499219     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940600665701     Document Type: Review

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