Credibility in compliance and punishment: Leader specific punishments and credibility

Journal of Politics

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 248-258

  McGillivray, Fiona ^a   Smith, Alastair ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646358520     PISSN: 00223816     EISSN: 14682508     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00403.x     Document Type: Article

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