The impact of leadership turnover and domestic institutions on international cooperation

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 49, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 639-660

  McGillivray, Fiona ^a   Smith, Alastair ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperation; International cooperation; Leadership survival; Prisoner's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 26644457660     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002705279478     Document Type: Article

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