Institutional complementarities within corporate governance systems: A comparative study of bankruptcy rules

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 343-381

  Pochet, Christine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

Bank oriented systems; Bankruptcy law; Comparative corporate governance; Institutional complementarities; Market oriented systems; National system of corporate governance; Stakeholders

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645928815     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1021219200695     Document Type: Article

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