A model of the supply of executives for outside directorships

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 645-659

  Conyon, Martin J ^a   Read, Laura E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Boards of directors; Corporate governance; Firm performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645875017     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.004     Document Type: Article

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