The interaction among multiple governance mechanisms in young newly public firms

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 449-466

  Berry, Tammy K ^a   Paige Fields, L ^b   Wilkins, Michael S ^b  

^a Berry Consultants   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Initial public offerings

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645894110     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.003     Document Type: Article

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