Integrative and distributive bargaining situations in the European Union: What difference does it make?

Negotiation Journal

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 145-165

  Da Conceição Heldt, Eugénia ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645701048     PISSN: 07484526     EISSN: 15719979     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1571-9979.2006.00092.x     Document Type: Article

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