Review article: Institutions and rationality in politics - Three varieties of neo-institutionalists

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 553-582

  Kato, Junko ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041050858     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0007123400007602     Document Type: Review

References (192)

1. T. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol, eds, Bringing The State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 3-37); J. G. Marchand J. P. Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organized Factors in Political Life', American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), 734-49; J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989).
2. T. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol, eds, Bringing The State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 3-37); J. G. Marchand J. P. Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organized Factors in Political Life', American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), 734-49; J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989).
3. T. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol, eds, Bringing The State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 3-37); J. G. Marchand J. P. Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organized Factors in Political Life', American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), 734-49; J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989).
4. T. Mitchell, 'The Limit of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and the Critics', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 77-96; T. Mitchell, 'Response: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1017-21; J. Bendix, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1007-10; B. Ollman, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1014-17; B. H. Sparrow, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 82 (1992), 1010-14.
5. T. Mitchell, 'The Limit of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and the Critics', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 77-96; T. Mitchell, 'Response: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1017-21; J. Bendix, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1007-10; B. Ollman, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1014-17; B. H. Sparrow, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 82 (1992), 1010-14.
6. T. Mitchell, 'The Limit of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and the Critics', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 77-96; T. Mitchell, 'Response: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1017-21; J. Bendix, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1007-10; B. Ollman, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1014-17; B. H. Sparrow, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 82 (1992), 1010-14.
7. T. Mitchell, 'The Limit of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and the Critics', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 77-96; T. Mitchell, 'Response: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1017-21; J. Bendix, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1007-10; B. Ollman, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1014-17; B. H. Sparrow, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 82 (1992), 1010-14.
8. T. Mitchell, 'The Limit of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and the Critics', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 77-96; T. Mitchell, 'Response: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1017-21; J. Bendix, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1007-10; B. Ollman, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1014-17; B. H. Sparrow, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 82 (1992), 1010-14.
9. G. A. Almond, 'The Return to the State', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 853-74;
10. O. K. Pederson, 'Nine Questions to a Neo-Institutional Theory in Political Science', Scandinavian Journal of Political Science, 14 (1991), 125-48.
11. H. A. Simon, 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1955), reprinted in H. A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982); and H. A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); H.A. Simon, 'Rational Choice and the Structure of Environment', Psychological Review, 63 (1956), reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality and Simon, Models of Man.
12. H. A. Simon, 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1955), reprinted in H. A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982); and H. A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); H.A. Simon, 'Rational Choice and the Structure of Environment', Psychological Review, 63 (1956), reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality and Simon, Models of Man.
13. H. A. Simon, 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1955), reprinted in H. A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982); and H. A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); H.A. Simon, 'Rational Choice and the Structure of Environment', Psychological Review, 63 (1956), reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality and Simon, Models of Man.
14. H. A. Simon, 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1955), reprinted in H. A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982); and H. A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); H.A. Simon, 'Rational Choice and the Structure of Environment', Psychological Review, 63 (1956), reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality and Simon, Models of Man.
15. H. A. Simon, 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1955), reprinted in H. A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982); and H. A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); H.A. Simon, 'Rational Choice and the Structure of Environment', Psychological Review, 63 (1956), reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality and Simon, Models of Man.
16. H. A. Simon, 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1955), reprinted in H. A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982); and H. A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); H.A. Simon, 'Rational Choice and the Structure of Environment', Psychological Review, 63 (1956), reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality and Simon, Models of Man.
17. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In'. She does not use the term 'new institutionalism'.
18. M. D. McCubbins, 'Introduction', in P. Cowhey and M. D. McCubbins, eds. Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1-16.
19. D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
20. For example, S. Steinmo and K. Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-32; March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions; M. Levi, K. S. Cook, J. A. O'Brien and H. Faye, 'Introduction: The Limits of Rationality', in K. S. Cook and M. Levi, eds, The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 219-63); W. R. Keech, R. H. Bates and P. Lange, 'Political Economy within Nations', in W. Crotty, ed., Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol. 2 (Evanston, NJ: Northwestern University Press, 1991), pp. 1-16; P. A. Hall and R. C. R. Taylor, 'Political Science and Four New Institutionalisms' (presented to the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association in New York, 1994).
21. For example, S. Steinmo and K. Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-32; March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions; M. Levi, K. S. Cook, J. A. O'Brien and H. Faye, 'Introduction: The Limits of Rationality', in K. S. Cook and M. Levi, eds, The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 219-63); W. R. Keech, R. H. Bates and P. Lange, 'Political Economy within Nations', in W. Crotty, ed., Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol. 2 (Evanston, NJ: Northwestern University Press, 1991), pp. 1-16; P. A. Hall and R. C. R. Taylor, 'Political Science and Four New Institutionalisms' (presented to the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association in New York, 1994).
22. For example, S. Steinmo and K. Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-32; March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions; M. Levi, K. S. Cook, J. A. O'Brien and H. Faye, 'Introduction: The Limits of Rationality', in K. S. Cook and M. Levi, eds, The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 219-63); W. R. Keech, R. H. Bates and P. Lange, 'Political Economy within Nations', in W. Crotty, ed., Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol. 2 (Evanston, NJ: Northwestern University Press, 1991), pp. 1-16; P. A. Hall and R. C. R. Taylor, 'Political Science and Four New Institutionalisms' (presented to the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association in New York, 1994).
23. For example, S. Steinmo and K. Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-32; March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions; M. Levi, K. S. Cook, J. A. O'Brien and H. Faye, 'Introduction: The Limits of Rationality', in K. S. Cook and M. Levi, eds, The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 219-63); W. R. Keech, R. H. Bates and P. Lange, 'Political Economy within Nations', in W. Crotty, ed., Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol. 2 (Evanston, NJ: Northwestern University Press, 1991), pp. 1-16; P. A. Hall and R. C. R. Taylor, 'Political Science and Four New Institutionalisms' (presented to the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association in New York, 1994).
24. For example, S. Steinmo and K. Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-32; March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions; M. Levi, K. S. Cook, J. A. O'Brien and H. Faye, 'Introduction: The Limits of Rationality', in K. S. Cook and M. Levi, eds, The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 219-63); W. R. Keech, R. H. Bates and P. Lange, 'Political Economy within Nations', in W. Crotty, ed., Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol. 2 (Evanston, NJ: Northwestern University Press, 1991), pp. 1-16; P. A. Hall and R. C. R. Taylor, 'Political Science and Four New Institutionalisms' (presented to the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association in New York, 1994).
25. The terms 'institutions' and 'organizations' are often used synonymously because both can be applied to some collective bodies, for example, the state, bureaucracy, firm, market and so on. But, I consider 'organizations' the better term in the more specific context in which one presupposes certain internal structures in such entities and regards these bodies as unified actors. Knight presents a similar definition of organizations (see J. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)).
26. Because most scholars who endorse the socio-historical approach pay too little attention to the difference in the rationality assumption between the second and the third groups, I also do not distinguish them in this section. Their differences will be introduced later.
27. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In', pp. 4-6.
28. March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, pp. 3-8.
29. P. C. Ordeshook, 'The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy', in J. Alt and K. A. Shepsle, eds, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 9-30.
30. For example, see P. A. Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), and Ordeshook, 'Emerging Discipline of Political Economy'.
31. For example, see P. A. Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), and Ordeshook, 'Emerging Discipline of Political Economy'.
32. Steinmo and Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics'. Their edited book (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics) is a collection of essays, many of which have developed into books. For example, C. A. Dunlavy, Political Structure and Institutional Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); V. C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993): and S. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993). These works are good examples of historical institutionalism, but I will review only Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, because of the limited space here.
33. Steinmo and Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics'. Their edited book (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics) is a collection of essays, many of which have developed into books. For example, C. A. Dunlavy, Political Structure and Institutional Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); V. C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993): and S. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993). These works are good examples of historical institutionalism, but I will review only Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, because of the limited space here.
34. Steinmo and Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics'. Their edited book (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics) is a collection of essays, many of which have developed into books. For example, C. A. Dunlavy, Political Structure and Institutional Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); V. C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993): and S. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993). These works are good examples of historical institutionalism, but I will review only Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, because of the limited space here.
35. Steinmo and Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics'. Their edited book (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics) is a collection of essays, many of which have developed into books. For example, C. A. Dunlavy, Political Structure and Institutional Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); V. C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993): and S. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993). These works are good examples of historical institutionalism, but I will review only Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, because of the limited space here.
36. Steinmo and Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', p. 12.
37. W. A. Niskanen Jr, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine, 1971).
38. G. Brennan and J. M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
39. A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957);
40. J. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consents (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962);
41. W. H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Social Choice and the Theory of Democracy (New York: Freeman, 1982).
42. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
43. Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy.
44. R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science,13 (1989), 588-611; M.P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982), 33-66; M. D. McCubhins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-18; M. D. McCubbins and T. Schwanz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy, K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds, Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 132-63.
45. R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science,13 (1989), 588-611; M.P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982), 33-66; M. D. McCubhins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-18; M. D. McCubbins and T. Schwanz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy, K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds, Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 132-63.
46. R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science,13 (1989), 588-611; M.P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982), 33-66; M. D. McCubhins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-18; M. D. McCubbins and T. Schwanz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy, K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds, Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 132-63.
47. R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science,13 (1989), 588-611; M.P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982), 33-66; M. D. McCubhins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-18; M. D. McCubbins and T. Schwanz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy, K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds, Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 132-63.
48. R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science,13 (1989), 588-611; M.P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982), 33-66; M. D. McCubhins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-18; M. D. McCubbins and T. Schwanz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy, K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds, Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 132-63.
49. R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science,13 (1989), 588-611; M.P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982), 33-66; M. D. McCubhins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-18; M. D. McCubbins and T. Schwanz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy, K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds, Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 132-63.
50. R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science,13 (1989), 588-611; M.P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982), 33-66; M. D. McCubhins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-18; M. D. McCubbins and T. Schwanz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy, K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds, Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 132-63.
51. R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science,13 (1989), 588-611; M.P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982), 33-66; M. D. McCubhins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-18; M. D. McCubbins and T. Schwanz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy, K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds, Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 132-63.
52. R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science,13 (1989), 588-611; M.P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982), 33-66; M. D. McCubhins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-18; M. D. McCubbins and T. Schwanz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy, K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds, Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 132-63.
53. R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science,13 (1989), 588-611; M.P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982), 33-66; M. D. McCubhins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-18; M. D. McCubbins and T. Schwanz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy, K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds, Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 132-63.
54. T. M. Moe, 'The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy', in O. E. Williamson, ed, Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 116-53.
55. Pederson presents a categorization that includes (1) a state-centred theory, (2) a strategic relational theory, and (3) an institutional theory (Pederson, 'Nine Questions to a Neo-Institutional Theory', p. 126). The first and third groups in his categorization may correspond to the first and third in my grouping, respectively. But I do not give an independent place to a strategic relational theory of the state, such as Jessop's (see B. Jessop, State Theory (London: Polity Press, 1991)). Instead, I include it in the first group of works studying the state. This difference derives from Pederson's concern with methodology and theorization in the socio-historical new institutionalism, especially the concept of the state. Rather, my categorization is based on differences in basic units of institutional analysis.
56. Pederson presents a categorization that includes (1) a state-centred theory, (2) a strategic relational theory, and (3) an institutional theory (Pederson, 'Nine Questions to a Neo-Institutional Theory', p. 126). The first and third groups in his categorization may correspond to the first and third in my grouping, respectively. But I do not give an independent place to a strategic relational theory of the state, such as Jessop's (see B. Jessop, State Theory (London: Polity Press, 1991)). Instead, I include it in the first group of works studying the state. This difference derives from Pederson's concern with methodology and theorization in the socio-historical new institutionalism, especially the concept of the state. Rather, my categorization is based on differences in basic units of institutional analysis.
57. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In'.
58. P. R. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multi-national, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979): S. D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); E. A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981 ); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); A. Stepan, State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); S. Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C. Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975): E. K. Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, Mass.: Transaction Books, 1978).
59. P. R. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multi-national, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979): S. D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); E. A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981 ); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); A. Stepan, State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); S. Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C. Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975): E. K. Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, Mass.: Transaction Books, 1978).
60. P. R. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multi-national, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979): S. D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); E. A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981 ); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); A. Stepan, State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); S. Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C. Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975): E. K. Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, Mass.: Transaction Books, 1978).
61. P. R. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multi-national, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979): S. D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); E. A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981 ); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); A. Stepan, State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); S. Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C. Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975): E. K. Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, Mass.: Transaction Books, 1978).
62. P. R. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multi-national, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979): S. D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); E. A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981 ); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); A. Stepan, State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); S. Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C. Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975): E. K. Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, Mass.: Transaction Books, 1978).
63. P. R. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multi-national, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979): S. D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); E. A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981 ); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); A. Stepan, State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); S. Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C. Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975): E. K. Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, Mass.: Transaction Books, 1978).
64. P. R. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multi-national, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979): S. D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); E. A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981 ); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); A. Stepan, State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); S. Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C. Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975): E. K. Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, Mass.: Transaction Books, 1978).
65. P. R. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multi-national, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979): S. D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); E. A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981 ); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); A. Stepan, State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); S. Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C. Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975): E. K. Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, Mass.: Transaction Books, 1978).
66. P. C. Schmitter and C. Lehmbruch, eds, Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979). Another example of comparative studies on corporatism is S. D. Berger, Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
67. P. C. Schmitter and C. Lehmbruch, eds, Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979). Another example of comparative studies on corporatism is S. D. Berger, Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
68. P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Hall, Governing the Economy; J. A. Hart, Rival Capitalists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); P. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); J. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
69. P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Hall, Governing the Economy; J. A. Hart, Rival Capitalists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); P. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); J. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
70. P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Hall, Governing the Economy; J. A. Hart, Rival Capitalists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); P. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); J. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
71. P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Hall, Governing the Economy; J. A. Hart, Rival Capitalists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); P. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); J. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
72. P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Hall, Governing the Economy; J. A. Hart, Rival Capitalists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); P. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); J. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
73. P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Hall, Governing the Economy; J. A. Hart, Rival Capitalists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); P. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); J. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
74. P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Hall, Governing the Economy; J. A. Hart, Rival Capitalists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); P. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); J. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
75. The extension of this perspective in political science may be very close to 'sociological institutionalism', named by Hall and Taylor in 'Political Science and Four New Institutionalisms', which defines the institution more loosely and flexibly. For example, see W. W. Powell and P. J. Dimaggie, eds, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991).
76. The extension of this perspective in political science may be very close to 'sociological institutionalism', named by Hall and Taylor in 'Political Science and Four New Institutionalisms', which defines the institution more loosely and flexibly. For example, see W. W. Powell and P. J. Dimaggie, eds, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991).
77. For his interest in the rational choice approach, see J. Elster, Ulysses and Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). For his interest in social norms, see J. Elster, The Cements of Society: A Study of Social Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); J. Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
78. For his interest in the rational choice approach, see J. Elster, Ulysses and Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). For his interest in social norms, see J. Elster, The Cements of Society: A Study of Social Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); J. Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
79. For his interest in the rational choice approach, see J. Elster, Ulysses and Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). For his interest in social norms, see J. Elster, The Cements of Society: A Study of Social Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); J. Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
80. Peter A. Hall, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
81. March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. Some of the works, of course, may involve more than one perspective and, thus, it is difficult to classify all the works into the above-mentioned categories. For example, Katzenstein's work can be placed somewhere between the first and second groups, and Friedman's between the second and third. See P. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1978); D. Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
82. March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. Some of the works, of course, may involve more than one perspective and, thus, it is difficult to classify all the works into the above-mentioned categories. For example, Katzenstein's work can be placed somewhere between the first and second groups, and Friedman's between the second and third. See P. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1978); D. Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
83. March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. Some of the works, of course, may involve more than one perspective and, thus, it is difficult to classify all the works into the above-mentioned categories. For example, Katzenstein's work can be placed somewhere between the first and second groups, and Friedman's between the second and third. See P. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1978); D. Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
84. Pederson, 'Nine Questions to a Neo-Institutional Theory', also presents a characterization of common theoretical points of the first group of institutionalists. My presentation here is compatible with, but still distinctive from, each of his points, because here I am primarily concerned with its relationship with the rationality assumption, which Pederson includes, but does not make the focus of his discussion.
85. This definition is oversimplified, but, at this point, it is sufficient to show that the criticism on the rationality concept is misdirected. In the final section, I will clarify further the concept of economic rationality in contrast with the bounded rationality concept.
86. E. Ostrom, 'Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 237-50.
87. March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions.
88. Steinmo and Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics'.
89. Ostrom, 'Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis'.
90. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict.
91. Before Knight, some empirical and theoretical works showed that social institutions are human artefacts but that their formations are not entirely explained by relying on rational behaviour. For an example of empirical work, see O. Young, Resource Regimes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
92. E. A. Nordlinger, 'The Return to the State: Critiques', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 875-85, especially pp. 880-1.
93. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government.
94. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
95. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In', p. 15.
96. Mitchell has already shown in detail that Skocpol's perspective of state organization in States and Social Revolutions ultimately relies on the ideology or interest of political leaders or rulers who are constituents of the state (see Mitchell, 'Limit of the State', pp. 86-9). Kitschelt also considers the combination of historical structuralism and the rational choice approach in Skocpol's work as evidence of the compatibility of the socio-historical and rational choice approaches. See H. Kitschelt, 'Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?' American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1028-34, n. 1.
97. Mitchell has already shown in detail that Skocpol's perspective of state organization in States and Social Revolutions ultimately relies on the ideology or interest of political leaders or rulers who are constituents of the state (see Mitchell, 'Limit of the State', pp. 86-9). Kitschelt also considers the combination of historical structuralism and the rational choice approach in Skocpol's work as evidence of the compatibility of the socio-historical and rational choice approaches. See H. Kitschelt, 'Political Regime Change:
98. I thank Stephan Haggard for his suggestion that I should include this point here.
99. Mitchell, 'Limit of the State'.
100. Bendix, 'Controversy'; Sparrow, 'Controversy'; Ollman, 'Controversy'.
101. Bendix, 'Controversy'; Sparrow, 'Controversy'; Ollman, 'Controversy'.
102. Bendix, 'Controversy'; Sparrow, 'Controversy'; Ollman, 'Controversy'.
103. Riker, 'Political Science and Rational Choice', p. 175.
104. Riker, 'Political Science and Rational Choice', p. 175.
105. This adjectival clause is important to defend the rationality assumption against the finding in psychology that human behaviours in experimental situations diverge from what a theory of rational choice predicts. See A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, 'Rational Choice and the Framing of Decision', in Hogarth and Reder, eds, Rational Choice. Becker turns this qualification into the strength of the rationality assumption by showing that economic behaviours at the market level can be rational even though irrational decisions dominate individual behaviour in that market. See G. S. Becker, 'Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory', Journal of Political Economy, 70 (1962), 1-13.
106. This adjectival clause is important to defend the rationality assumption against the finding in psychology that human behaviours in experimental situations diverge from what a theory of rational choice predicts. See A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, 'Rational Choice and the Framing of Decision', in Hogarth and Reder, eds, Rational Choice. Becker turns this qualification into the strength of the rationality assumption by showing that economic behaviours at the market level can be rational even though irrational decisions dominate individual behaviour in that market. See G. S. Becker, 'Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory', Journal of Political Economy, 70 (1962), 1-13.
107. For example, see M. McCubbins, 'Introduction', in Cowhey and McCubbins, eds, Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States.
108. Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy.
109. R. H. Bates, 'Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development', in Alt and Shepsle, eds, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, pp. 31-54.
110. R. H. Bates, 'Some Contemporary Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian Change', in A. Kohli, ed., The State and Development in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
111. For example, Bates applies this framework to several aspects of agrarian societies in Africa from pre-colonial and post-colonial periods (see R. H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
112. Bates, 'Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development', p. 34.
113. Another example of the application of the choice-theoretic approach to rural development emphasizes the more specific utility of the approach, that is, increasing the understanding of collective decision problems in rural development (see C. S. Russell and N. K. Nicholson, eds, Public Choice and Rural Development (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future Inc., 1981)).
114. Bates, 'Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development', p. 54.
115. D. Little, 'Rational-Choice Models and Asian Studies', Journal of Asian Studies, 50 (1991), 35-52.
116. Little, 'Rational Choice Models and Asian Studies', p. 35.
117. Little, 'Rational Choice Models and Asian Studies', p. 43.
118. O. E. Williamson, 'The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes', Journal of Economic Literature, 19 (1981), 1537-68, especially p. 1544.
119. H. A. Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought', American Economic Review, 68 (1978), 1-16, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality.
120. H. A. Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought', American Economic Review, 68 (1978), 1-16, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality.
121. This article is also cited by Williamson, 'Modern Corporation', p. 1544.
122. Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought', p. 6.
123. Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought'.
124. Hall, Governing the Economy, p. 19.
125. Hall uses 'organizations' to mean the same as 'institutions' (see Hall, Governing the Economy. p. 19).
126. He actually uses the term 'public choice theory' in his discussion, and broadly includes the approaches that apply economic methods to political analysis. But, we can replace this term with the 'rational choice approach' without changing what he means.
127. Hall, Governing the Economy, pp. 10-13.
128. He treats organization theory based on the concept of bounded rationality (the third group) separately from the conventional public (rational) choice theory based on economic rationality (the second group) but he includes both in the discussion of public choice theory (see Hall, Governing the Economy, pp. 10-13). I will show in the last section that this version of organization theory belongs to the third category of new institutionalists if the two different concepts of rationality are clearly distinguished.
129. Hall, Governing the Economy, pp. 12-13.
130. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery.
131. E. A. Nordlinger, 'The Return to the State: Critiques', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 875-85.
132. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery, p.4.
133. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery, p. 5.
134. R. Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
135. Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 3-5.
136. He categorizes different interests in trade as those represented by labour, capital and land, which correspond to a three-factor model of trade.
137. A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962).
138. B. Moore Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1967).
139. A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
140. The recent work by Putnam is also a good example of the works which combine historical observation and empirical data with an analysis of collective action problems by rational individuals. By comparing communities in northern and southern Italy using detailed empirical data over two decades, Putnam's work has discovered the importance of the environment of individual behaviour in determining the consequences of collective action (see R. D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
141. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy.
142. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p. 198.
143. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p. 199.
144. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p. 200.
145. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, chaps. 4-6.
146. It is possible to speculate that the selection of the policies to be studied is a result of the differences between the works by Rogowski and Steinmo. In a trade issue, those with vested interests are more attentive to policy problems and sensitive to gains and losses, because trade affects their major economic activities. However, a tax issue influences the members of a society widely but not very explicitly, and thus they are less likely to seek reliable information and are not always as eager to pursue their interests. In other words, if the political actors put a higher priority on tax issues m their political and/or economic activities, they can be expected to seek their interests more rationally. My work on the recent Japanese tax reform explores this possibility by focusing on a bureaucratic organization in which the policy problems and goals are explicitly defined and shared among members (see J. Kato, The Problem of Bureaucratic Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
147. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, pp. 201-2.
148. M. Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press 1988).
149. B. Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley-University of California Press, 1994).
150. Geddes, Politician's Dilemma, p. 187.
151. Swedberg, Economics and Sociology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 41. Becker may go to an extreme here because, in another instance, he himself attempts to defend the approach instead of regarding its use only as a commitment (G. S. Becker, Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976)).
152. Swedberg, Economics and Sociology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 41. Becker may go to an extreme here because, in another instance, he himself attempts to defend the approach instead of regarding its use only as a commitment (G. S. Becker, Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976)).
153. Becker, Economic Approach to Human Behavior, p. 14 (emphasis added). Of course, other rational choice theorists may prefer to defend the rationality assumption for other reasons. For example, G. Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 39-43, defends the rational choice theory as a more coherent theory than alternative approaches because of its theoretical clarity, equilibrium analysis, deductive reasoning, and the interchangeability of individuals in an analysis.
154. Becker, Economic Approach to Human Behavior, p. 14 (emphasis added). Of course, other rational choice theorists may prefer to defend the rationality assumption for other reasons. For example, G. Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 39-43, defends the rational choice theory as a more coherent theory than alternative approaches because of its theoretical clarity, equilibrium analysis, deductive reasoning, and the interchangeability of individuals in an analysis.
155. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, Vol. 2, p. 370.
156. The minimax rule in a game theoretical situation has the same premise, but applies a different rule of choosing alternative means from a maximization rule and chooses an alternative so as to minimize the worst possible loss.
157. Simon uses the terms 'procedural rationality' or 'bounded rationality' to mean the same concept which he presents. Both terms - 'bounded rationality' and 'procedural rationality' - mean basically the same concept, though Simon usually uses the former in more formal and the latter in more descriptive analysis. For a formal presentation of this concept, see Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', and Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'. For an interesting contrast between the rationality concept in game theory and that in learning theory, see H. A. Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory', Psychometrika, 21 (1956), 267-72, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, and Simon, Models of Man. For further understanding of this concept, see Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, pp. 203-95; Simon, Models of Man, pp. 196-206 and pp. 241-79. For application to political science, see H. A. Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 293-304.
158. Simon uses the terms 'procedural rationality' or 'bounded rationality' to mean the same concept which he presents. Both terms - 'bounded rationality' and 'procedural rationality' - mean basically the same concept, though Simon usually uses the former in more formal and the latter in more descriptive analysis. For a formal presentation of this concept, see Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', and Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'. For an interesting contrast between the rationality concept in game theory and that in learning theory, see H. A. Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory', Psychometrika, 21 (1956), 267-72, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, and Simon, Models of Man. For further understanding of this concept, see Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, pp. 203-95; Simon, Models of Man, pp. 196-206 and pp. 241-79. For application to political science, see H. A. Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 293-304.
159. Simon uses the terms 'procedural rationality' or 'bounded rationality' to mean the same concept which he presents. Both terms - 'bounded rationality' and 'procedural rationality' - mean basically the same concept, though Simon usually uses the former in more formal and the latter in more descriptive analysis. For a formal presentation of this concept, see Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', and Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'. For an interesting contrast between the rationality concept in game theory and that in learning theory, see H. A. Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory', Psychometrika, 21 (1956), 267-72, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, and Simon, Models of Man. For further understanding of this concept, see Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, pp. 203-95; Simon, Models of Man, pp. 196-206 and pp. 241-79. For application to political science, see H. A. Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 293-304.
160. Simon uses the terms 'procedural rationality' or 'bounded rationality' to mean the same concept which he presents. Both terms - 'bounded rationality' and 'procedural rationality' - mean basically the same concept, though Simon usually uses the former in more formal and the latter in more descriptive analysis. For a formal presentation of this concept, see Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', and Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'. For an interesting contrast between the rationality concept in game theory and that in learning theory, see H. A. Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory', Psychometrika, 21 (1956), 267-72, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, and Simon, Models of Man. For further understanding of this concept, see Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, pp. 203-95; Simon, Models of Man, pp. 196-206 and pp. 241-79. For application to political science, see H. A. Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 293-304.
161. Simon uses the terms 'procedural rationality' or 'bounded rationality' to mean the same concept which he presents. Both terms - 'bounded rationality' and 'procedural rationality' - mean basically the same concept, though Simon usually uses the former in more formal and the latter in more descriptive analysis. For a formal presentation of this concept, see Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', and Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'. For an interesting contrast between the rationality concept in game theory and that in learning theory, see H. A. Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory', Psychometrika, 21 (1956), 267-72, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, and Simon, Models of Man. For further understanding of this concept, see Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, pp. 203-95; Simon, Models of Man, pp. 196-206 and pp. 241-79. For application to political science, see H. A. Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 293-304.
162. Simon uses the terms 'procedural rationality' or 'bounded rationality' to mean the same concept which he presents. Both terms - 'bounded rationality' and 'procedural rationality' - mean basically the same concept, though Simon usually uses the former in more formal and the latter in more descriptive analysis. For a formal presentation of this concept, see Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', and Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'. For an interesting contrast between the rationality concept in game theory and that in learning theory, see H. A. Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory', Psychometrika, 21 (1956), 267-72, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, and Simon, Models of Man. For further understanding of this concept, see Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, pp. 203-95; Simon, Models of Man, pp. 196-206 and pp. 241-79. For application to political science, see H. A. Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 293-304.
163. Simon uses the terms 'procedural rationality' or 'bounded rationality' to mean the same concept which he presents. Both terms - 'bounded rationality' and 'procedural rationality' - mean basically the same concept, though Simon usually uses the former in more formal and the latter in more descriptive analysis. For a formal presentation of this concept, see Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', and Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'. For an interesting contrast between the rationality concept in game theory and that in learning theory, see H. A. Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory', Psychometrika, 21 (1956), 267-72, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, and Simon, Models of Man. For further understanding of this concept, see Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, pp. 203-95; Simon, Models of Man, pp. 196-206 and pp. 241-79. For application to political science, see H. A. Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 293-304.
164. Simon uses the terms 'procedural rationality' or 'bounded rationality' to mean the same concept which he presents. Both terms - 'bounded rationality' and 'procedural rationality' - mean basically the same concept, though Simon usually uses the former in more formal and the latter in more descriptive analysis. For a formal presentation of this concept, see Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', and Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'. For an interesting contrast between the rationality concept in game theory and that in learning theory, see H. A. Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory', Psychometrika, 21 (1956), 267-72, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, and Simon, Models of Man. For further understanding of this concept, see Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, pp. 203-95; Simon, Models of Man, pp. 196-206 and pp. 241-79. For application to political science, see H. A. Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 293-304.
165. Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory', p. 271.
166. Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory'. The application of bounded rationality is also different from an expected utility theory in economics. The expected utility theory presumes the existence of a 'real situation' and then defines the utility function with probabilities.
167. Simon, Models of Man, p. 198.
168. Simon, Models of Man, p. 199.
169. H. A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 3rd edn (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 79.
170. Simon himself makes this point very clear in his recent writing. See H. A. Simon, 'The State of American Political Science: Professor Lowi's View of Our Discipline', Political Science and Politics, 36 (1993), 49-50, especially p. 50.
171. In decision theories and organization theories, the concept of bounded rationality has long attracted the attention of scholars. Allison's work on the Cuban Missile Crisis is a prominent example of such studies (Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1971)). However, the employment of the bounded rationality concept in these fields aims to illuminate the limitations of the perception and information capabilities of human beings without paying much attention to the environment of rational behaviour. This is one of the important reasons why the distinction between the two different concepts of rationality has been neglected in political science.
172. For example, see Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics'.
173. Such examples are: North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance; O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism. This misunderstanding may derive from the fact that both North and Williamson utilize the concept of bounded rationality to emphasize the incompleteness of information and information burdens on rational individual.
174. Such examples are: North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance; O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism. This misunderstanding may derive from the fact that both North and Williamson utilize the concept of bounded rationality to emphasize the incompleteness of information and information burdens on rational individual.
175. Such examples are: North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance; O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism. This misunderstanding may derive from the fact that both North and Williamson utilize the concept of bounded rationality to emphasize the incompleteness of information and information burdens on rational individual.
176. Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice'; Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'; Simon, 'Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory'.
177. Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice'; Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'; Simon, 'Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory'.
178. Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice'; Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of Environment'; Simon, 'Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory'.
179. H. A. Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought', American Economic Review, 68 (1978), 1-16, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality; Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics'.
180. H. A. Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought', American Economic Review, 68 (1978), 1-16, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality; Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics'.
181. H. A. Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought', American Economic Review, 68 (1978), 1-16, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality; Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics'.
182. Curiously enough, Becker, as I have shown above, agrees with Simon that the economic approach is supported by auxiliary assumptions. They differ in whether to give up the economic approach when faced with the necessity of assumptions other than economic rationality. Becker maintains the assumption of economic rationality because he believes it serves to bind together various human behaviour within a unified framework. Simon replaces it with the assumption of bounded rationality because he is more concerned with specifying auxiliary assumptions that support his framework for analysing rational behaviour.
183. Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
184. A theoretical example of a behaviour that is truly counter to the assumption of economic rationality is a 'commitment' that 'involves choosing an action that yields a lower expected welfare than an alternative available action' (A. K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 32-3). When a person's consistent ordering of choosing behaviour is not necessarily related to the person's individual welfare, 'the existence of a "variety of motives" makes a difference' (see A. K. Sen, 'Beneconfusion', in J. G. T. Meeks, ed., Thoughtful Economic Man: Essays On Rationality, Moral Rules and Benevolence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 12-16, at p. 15). In other words, the rational choice framework is silent about the human psychology that shapes the actor's motivation to make choices. A rational choice theorist's quick response to Sen's point about limitations of the economic rationality assumption may be: as long as social scientists are concerned with social outcomes and not with individual psychology, the economic assumption is useful (see W. Riker, 'Political Science and Rational Choice', in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, at p. 173). But, some economists are increasingly interested in that field. For example, see R. M. Hogarth and M. W. Reder, eds, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economies and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
185. A theoretical example of a behaviour that is truly counter to the assumption of economic rationality is a 'commitment' that 'involves choosing an action that yields a lower expected welfare than an alternative available action' (A. K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 32-3). When a person's consistent ordering of choosing behaviour is not necessarily related to the person's individual welfare, 'the existence of a "variety of motives" makes a difference' (see A. K. Sen, 'Beneconfusion', in J. G. T. Meeks, ed., Thoughtful Economic Man: Essays On Rationality, Moral Rules and Benevolence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 12-16, at p. 15). In other words, the rational choice framework is silent about the human psychology that shapes the actor's motivation to make choices. A rational choice theorist's quick response to Sen's point about limitations of the economic rationality assumption may be: as long as social scientists are concerned with social outcomes and not with individual psychology, the economic assumption is useful (see W. Riker, 'Political Science and Rational Choice', in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, at p. 173). But, some economists are increasingly interested in that field. For example, see R. M. Hogarth and M. W. Reder, eds, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economies and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
186. A theoretical example of a behaviour that is truly counter to the assumption of economic rationality is a 'commitment' that 'involves choosing an action that yields a lower expected welfare than an alternative available action' (A. K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 32-3). When a person's consistent ordering of choosing behaviour is not necessarily related to the person's individual welfare, 'the existence of a "variety of motives" makes a difference' (see A. K. Sen, 'Beneconfusion', in J. G. T. Meeks, ed., Thoughtful Economic Man: Essays On Rationality, Moral Rules and Benevolence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 12-16, at p. 15). In other words, the rational choice framework is silent about the human psychology that shapes the actor's motivation to make choices. A rational choice theorist's quick response to Sen's point about limitations of the economic rationality assumption may be: as long as social scientists are concerned with social outcomes and not with individual psychology, the economic assumption is useful (see W. Riker, 'Political Science and Rational Choice', in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, at p. 173). But, some economists are increasingly interested in that field. For example, see R. M. Hogarth and M. W. Reder, eds, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economies and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
187. A theoretical example of a behaviour that is truly counter to the assumption of economic rationality is a 'commitment' that 'involves choosing an action that yields a lower expected welfare than an alternative available action' (A. K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 32-3). When a person's consistent ordering of choosing behaviour is not necessarily related to the person's individual welfare, 'the existence of a "variety of motives" makes a difference' (see A. K. Sen, 'Beneconfusion', in J. G. T. Meeks, ed., Thoughtful Economic Man: Essays On Rationality, Moral Rules and Benevolence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 12-16, at p. 15). In other words, the rational choice framework is silent about the human psychology that shapes the actor's motivation to make choices. A rational choice theorist's quick response to Sen's point about limitations of the economic rationality assumption may be: as long as social scientists are concerned with social outcomes and not with individual psychology, the economic assumption is useful (see W. Riker, 'Political Science and Rational Choice', in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, at p. 173). But, some economists are increasingly interested in that field. For example, see R. M. Hogarth and M. W. Reder, eds, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economies and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
188. Michael Taylor, 'Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change', Politics and Society, 17 (1989), 115-57. He defines a strict theory of rational choice as a thin rational choice theory as follows: '(1) rational action is action that is instrumental in achieving or advancing given aims in the light of given belief; (2) the agent is assumed to be egoistic; and (3) the range of incentives assumed to affect the agent is limited.'
189. Taylor, 'Structure, Culture, and Action', p. 150.
190. Silberman defines uncertainty as 'the inability to predict the kind of decisions that will arise and/or the degree of acceptance of decisions' (Bernard Silberman, Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)), p. 21.
191. Ian Budge, 'A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology, and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally', British Journal of Political Science 24 (1994), 443-67.
192. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Boston, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 3.