Dynamic enfranchisement

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 90, Issue 4-5, 2006, Pages 551-572

  Jack, William ^a   Lagunoff, Roger ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dictator delegation game; Dynamic games; Franchise extension; Voter enfranchisement

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645088215     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.05.003     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Acemoglu D., and Robinson J. Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality and growth in historical perspective. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000) 1167-1199
2. Acemoglu D., and Robinson J. A theory of political transitions. American Economic Review 91 (2001) 938-963
3. Barbera S., Maschler M., and Shalev S. Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution. Games and Economic Behavior 37 (2001) 40-78
4. Basar J., and Olsder. Dynamic Non-cooperative Game Theory. 2nd edition (1995), Academic Press, London/New York
5. Besley T., and Coate S. An economic theory of representative democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 12 (1997) 85-114
6. Conley J., and Temimi A. Endogenous enfranchisement when groups' preferences conflict. Journal of Political Economy 109 1 (2001) 79-102
7. de Tocqueville, A., 1886. Democracy in America, reprinted by Vintage Books, New York, 1990.
8. Fine J. The Ancient Greeks: A Critical History (1983), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
9. Finer S.E. The History of Government (1997), Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK
10. Fleck, R., Hanssen, A., 2003. The origins of democracy: a model with application to Ancient Greece, mimeo, Montana State University.
11. Gans J., and Smart M. Majority voting with single-crossing preferences. Journal of Public Economics 59 (1996) 219-237
12. Grandmont J.-M. Intermediate preferences and the majority rule. Econometrica 46 2 (1978) 317-330
13. Husted T., and Kenny L. The effect of the voting franchise on the size of government. Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997) 54-81
14. Jack, W., Lagunoff, R., 2005. Dynamic Enfranchisement, mimeo, Georgetown University, www.georgetown.edu/faculty/lagunofr/franch10.pdf.
15. Justman M., and Gradstein M. The industrial revolution, political transition, and the subsequent decline in inequality in 19th century Britain. Exploration in Economic History 36 (1999) 109-127
16. Klein, P., Krusell, P., Ríos Rull, J.-V., 2002. Time Consistent Public Expenditures, mimeo.
17. Lagunoff, R., 2005a. Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions, mimeo, Georgetown University, www.georgetown.edu/faculty/lagunofr/dynam-polit-b.pdf.
18. Lagunoff, R., 2005b. Stability and Reform of Political Institutions, mimeo, Georgetown University, www.georgetown.edu/faculty/lagunofr/dynam-polit.pdf.
19. Lizzeri, A., Persico, N., 2003. Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's 'Age of Reform', mimeo.
20. Osborne M., and Slivinsky A. A model of political competition with citizen candidates. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996) 65-96
21. Roberts K. Voting over income tax schedules. Journal of Public Economics 8 (1977) 329-340
22. Robert, K., 1998. Dynamic voting in clubs, mimeo, STICERD/Theoretical Economics Discussion Paper, LSE.
23. Roberts, Kevin, 1999. Voting in Organizations and Endogenous Hysteresis, mimeo, Nuffield College, Oxford.
24. Rothstein P. Order restricted preferences and majority rule. Social Choice and Welfare 7 (1990) 331-342