Endogenous enfranchisement when groups' preferences conflict

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 109, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 79-102

  Conley, J P ^a   Temimi, A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; PUBLIC GOODS; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0035086058     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/318601     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Power and taxes
2. Voting for public goods
3. Power and public goods
4. The effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government
5. The collective allocation of commodities in a democratic society: A generalization
6. The paradox of voting and candidate competition: A general equilibrium analysis
7. The pure theory of large two-candidate elections
8. A pational theory of the size of government
9. A strategic calculus of voting
10. Voter participation and strategic uncertainty
11. Rational turnout: The neglected role of groups
12. 'Relational goods' and participation: Incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action
13. What the downsian voter weights: A reassessment of the costs and benefits of action