The evolution of focal points

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 55, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 21-42

  Binmore, Ken ^a   Samuelson, Larry ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644917693     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.005     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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