Focal Points in Framed Strategic Forms

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 263-291

  Casajus, André ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Focal points; framing; isomorphisms; salience; symmetries

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346876662     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0771     Document Type: Article

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