Managerial ownership and firm performance: An analysis using switching simultaneous-equations models

Applied Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 161-181

  Chen, Ming Yuan ^a  

^a TAMKANG UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; MODEL; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT;

EID: 33644858395     PISSN: 00036846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00036840500368136     Document Type: Article

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