Sequential auctions for objects with common and private values

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 763-770

  Fatima, Shaheen ^a   Wooldridge, Michael ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Game theory; Multi object auctions

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; INFORMATION SCIENCE; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

BIDDERS; MULTI-OBJECT AUCTIONS; PRIVATE VALUE ELEMENTS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 33644801364     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

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