The importance of ordering in sequential auctions

Management Science

Volumn 49, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 673-682

  Elmaghraby, Wedad ^a  

^a Georgia Institute of Technology   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Procurement; Sequential; Vickrey

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; DECISION MAKING; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS; SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS;

MARKETING;

EID: 0038002640     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.49.5.673.15150     Document Type: Article

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