Examining the representation of causal knowledge

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-30

  Fugelsang, Jonathan A ^a   Thompson, Valerie A ^b   Dunbar, Kevin N ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

^c DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 32144454553     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546780500145678     Document Type: Article

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