Causal thinking in science: How scientists and students interpret the unexpected

Scientific and Technological Thinking

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 57-80

  Dunbar, Kevin N ^a   Fugelsang, Jonathan A ^b  

^a Dartmouth College   (United States)

^b DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84908927953     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781410611314     Document Type: Chapter

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