A dual-process model of belief and evidence interactions in causal reasoning

Memory and Cognition

Volumn 31, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 800-815

  Fugelsang, Jonathan A ^a,c   Thompson, Valerie A ^b  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

^c Dartmouth College   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; CORRELATION ANALYSIS; DECISION MAKING; EXPERIMENTAL MODEL; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INFORMATION PROCESSING; INTELLIGENCE TEST; MALE; NOMENCLATURE; NORMAL HUMAN; PERCEPTION; PERSONALITY TEST; PROCESS MODEL; TASK PERFORMANCE; THINKING; VERBAL MEMORY;

EID: 0041660601     PISSN: 0090502X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/BF03196118     Document Type: Article

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