The corporate objective revisited

Organization Science

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2004, Pages

  Sundaram, Anant K ^a   Inkpen, Andrew C ^a,b  

^a Garvin School of International Management   (United States)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Corporate goal; Corporate governance; Shareholder value; Stakeholder theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142746718     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1040.0068     Document Type: Review

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