Equilibrium agenda formation

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 21-57

  Dutta, Bhaskar ^a   Jackson, Matthew O ^b   Le Breton, Michel ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142739303     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0233-y     Document Type: Article

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