An informational rationale for committee gatekeeping power

Public Choice

Volumn 91, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 271-299

  Epstein, David ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031530326     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017955912840     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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