Governance of adjustments

Journal of Business

Volumn 77, Issue 2 SUPPL., 2004, Pages

  Wernerfelt, Birger ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042609506     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/381516     Document Type: Review

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