Direct and Indirect Bargaining Costs and the Scope of the Firm

Journal of Business

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 283-304

  Simester, Duncan ^a   Knez, Marc ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141873446     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/338704     Document Type: Article

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