Taking evolution seriously: What difference does it make for economics?

The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 102-131

  Vromen, Jack J ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 3042519707     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781845423490.00012     Document Type: Chapter

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