Institutions and preferences: An evolutionary perspective

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 153, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 771-779

  Huck, Steffen ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031283754     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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