Theories of punishment and empirical trends in corporate criminal sanctions

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 399-411

  Cohen, Mark A ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0039312480     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199607)17:4<399::AID-MDE769>3.0.CO;2-G     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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2. C. R. Alexander and M. A. Cohen (1994). Is there life after crime? How the market penalizes corporate criminals. Working Paper, Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University.
3. J. Arlen (1994). The potentially perverse effects of corporate criminal liability. Journal of Legal Studies, 23, 833.
4. G. S. Becker (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169–217.
5. G. S. Becker (1989). Make the punishment fit the corporate crime. Business Week, 13 March, 22.
6. J. Bosch and E. W. Eckard, Jr (1991). The profitability of price fixing: evidence from stock market reaction to federal indictments. Review of Economic and Statistics, 73, 309.
7. M. A. Cohen (1987). Optimal enforcement strategy to prevent oil spills: an application of a principal–agent model with moral hazard. Journal of Law and Economics 30, 23.
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10. M. A. Cohen (1992a). Sentencing guidelines and corporate criminal liability in the United States. Business & the Contemporary World, 4, 140.
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12. F. H. Easterbrook (1983). Criminal procedure as a market system. Journal of Legal Studies, 22, 289.
13. J. M. Karpoff and J. R. Lott, Jr (1993). The reputational penalty firms bear from committing criminal fraud. Journal of Law and Economics, 36, 757.
14. J. R. Lott, Jr (1992). Do we punish high income criminals too heavily? Economic Inquiry, 30, 583.
15. J. R. Lott, Jr (1992). An attempt at measuring the total monetary penalty from drug convictions: the importance of an individual’s reputation. Journal of Legal Studies, 21, 159.
16. A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (1993). Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability? International Review of Law and Economics, 3, 239.
17. R. A. Posner (1980). Retribution and related concepts of punishment. Journal of Legal Studies, 1, 71–92.
18. K. Segerson and T. Tietenberg (1992). The structure of penalties in environmental enforcement: an economic analysis. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 23, 179.
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20. United States Sentencing Commission (1991a). Chapter Eight — Sentencing of organizations. Guidelines Manual (November).
21. United States Sentencing Commission (1991b). Supplementary Report on Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, 30 August.