Regulating corporate criminal sanctions: Federal guidelines and the sentencing of public firms

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 393-422

  Alexander, Cindy R ^a   Arlen, Jennifer ^a   Cohen, Mark A ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040036288     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/467430     Document Type: Article

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