Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, and crime as an agency cost

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-34

  Alexander, Cindy R ^a   Cohen, Mark A ^b  

^a United States Department of Justice   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency cost; Corporation; Crime; Criminal; G3; Hidden action; K2; K4; L2; Ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008957226     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0929-1199(98)00015-7     Document Type: Article

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