Why is central bank independence so widely approved?

Journal of Economic Issues

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 843-865

  Forder, James ^a  

^a BALLIOL COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 29844450943     PISSN: 00213624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2005.11506857     Document Type: Review

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