Redistributive promises and the adoption of economic reform

American Economic Review

Volumn 93, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 256-264

  Jain, Sanjay ^a   Mukand, Sharun W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942729872     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/000282803321455269     Document Type: Article

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