Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 64-75

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Walsh, William E ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b IBM T J WATSON RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Mechanism design; Supply chain formation

Indexed keywords

AUTOMATION; ECONOMICS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

AUCTIONS; NEGOTIATION; PAYMENT SCHEMES; SUPPLY CHAIN FORMATION;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 0242624715     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/779928.779937     Document Type: Conference Paper

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