Information failures in health care

Annual Review of Information Science and Technology

Volumn 40, Issue , 2006, Pages 357-391

  Maclntosh Murray, Anu ^a   Choo, Chun Wei ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 28844460775     PISSN: 00664200     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1002/aris.1440400116     Document Type: Review

References (146)

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