Ordering top pay: Interpreting the signals

Journal of Management Studies

Volumn 42, Issue 7, 2005, Pages 1443-1468

  Perkins, Stephen J ^b   Hendry, Chris ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27844565755     PISSN: 00222380     EISSN: 14676486     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00550.x     Document Type: Review

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